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INTRODUCTION
It has long been thought that interdependence prevents war; in particular, the formation of global trade ties and international institutions create incentives to settle disputes before they come to violence.
2 Trade fosters economic dependence among governments, generates expectations about welfare gains, and can create a sense of community among nations. 3 Many believe that international institutions like preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) reinforce these peace-making processes, preventing war or human rights violations and consolidating democracy. 4 Trade institutions provide a formal mechanism through which states lengthen the shadow of future trade relations, credibly commit to economic interdependence, resolve disputes, and cooperate to overcome coordination problems; informally, they can create a sense of shared identity and increase trust.
For these reasons, economic interdependence should also prevent economic sanctions; a substantial literature on economic statecraft concludes that states' anticipation of lost trade benefits should deter the onset and decrease the duration of sanctions. This belief is taken for granted: we are aware of no study that considers whether or how trade institutions shape the probability that states engage in sanctioning behavior. The conflict literature on trade institutions is devoted almost exclusively to the prevention of war and repression while the literature on economic sanctions disregards international institutions entirely. 6 That no one has studied this question is remarkable because trade institutions are above all designed to discourage politically motivated market penalties between member states, the very thing sanctions harshly impose.
In the following pages we challenge the liberal idea that that a growing population of international trade institutions should deter the onset of economic sanctions, a widely used and 3 criticized policy of economic statecraft. Belief in the pacifying effects of trade institutions is too one-sided and empirically inaccurate. Instances of economic sanctions between members of trade institutions raise questions about the ability of these institutions to do their most basic job: to prevent states from closing markets. We propose an alternative structural perspective that views PTAs as vehicles for power politics that can exacerbate conflict by 1) creating asymmetries in material power that are known to cause disputes, 2) creating asymmetries in social power, increasing incentives for prestigious states to abuse this power, and 3) placing states in adversarial positions that create animosity instead of community.
In standing with the theme of this proposed special issue-Title-we accordingly offer the first systematic test of the proposition that mutual membership in PTAs decreases the propensity of member states to sanction each other. We begin with a brief overview of the state of knowledge regarding the onset, duration, and success rates of economic sanctions. We then discuss why it is commonly believed that international trade institutions should reduce the use of sanctions by raising the cost of disputes, helping to resolve them, or promoting like-minded security communities. We argue that contrary to this one-sided conventional wisdom, PTAs at times increase sanctioning behavior by creating disparities in relative market power and social power (prestige) as well as by encouraging states in similar structural positions to compete rather than cooperate. We specify our hypotheses and test them on sanctions onset using a dataset of sanctions episodes from 1947 through 2000.
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Economic sanctions are a form of political coercion ruled by similar dynamics as war, 7 but are commonly viewed as a more reasonable alternative to, or companion strategy for, the use of military force. 8 By design, sanctions punish through the manipulation of economic welfare; 9 they are "measures in which one country (the initiator) publicly suspends a major portion of its trade with another country (the target) to attain political objectives," such as compliance, subversion, 7 (Marinov 2003; Drezner 2003) 8 (Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997; Elliott 1998; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000) There is some question as to whether economic sanctions are a precursor to or substitute for military intervention. We are currently writing on the matter elsewhere and do not address that topic here for brevity. 9 (Nossal 1989) 4 deterrence, punishment, and symbolism. 10 We thus explicitly exclude sanctions initiated for economic purposes, such as the retaliatory sanctions permitted by some institutions for violation of trade agreements. The vast majority of research on sanctions accordingly studies their effectiveness, generally understood to be a matter of economic costs relative to political gains.
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By all accounts, sanctions have a debilitating effect on economic cooperation. Their use represents "a deadweight loss of utility" through lost welfare benefits for all governments involved 12 that mount as sanctions endure. 13 Sanctions can affect firms' ability to succeed in a competitive environment, imposing risks for businesses in both initiators and targets 14 The ability of initiators to impose costs on a target through sanctions, however, often depends on international institutions. A persistent assumption of sanctions research has been that multilateral cooperation among initiators is necessary for success. 18 Cooperation not only increases costs on target governments by escalating economic coercion but also demonstrates the credibility of an initiator's threat as well as its resolve to endure. Yet evidence shows otherwise:
international cooperation on its own is overvalued in determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions and unilateral sanctions are commonly more successful. 19 Rather, history shows that multilateral sanctions are most effective in achieving initiators' satisfaction when coordinated 10 (Lindsay 1986, p. 154) 11 (Baldwin 1985; Martin 1992; Drury 1992; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; Lektzian and Souva 2001) 12 (Pape 1997; Eaton and Engers 1999; Drezner 2003) 13 (Marinov 2003) 14 (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998; Lektzian and Souva 2001) 15 (Hufbauer et al. 1997) 16 (Hiscox 2006) 17 (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997) 18 (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; Mastanduno 1992; Gilpin 1984; Haass 1998; Martin 1992) 19 (Hufbauer et al. 1990) 5 within international institutions, which reduce transaction costs of cooperation and provide incentives to commit. 20 To the extent that international institutions are believed to matter for economic sanctions they are of importance in determining success rather than onset under conditions of multilateralism.
Yet very few people believe that sanctions are always or usually effective; mounting evidence is confounded by substantial methodological debates. 21 The most widely cited study concludes that economic sanctions are successful only one in three times. 22 Others argue this is an overly optimistic artifact of poor coding and case selection and that sanctions fail in nearly all cases; they are especially futile in the pursuit of non-economic goals because states are commonly willing to endure considerable punishment rather than concede to external pressures and may strategically redistribute resources to alleviate damages or shield privileged groups.
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It is puzzling, then, why sanctions can and do endure despite high costs to both the initiator and target and limited apparent success. 24 Some argue that the failure of sanctions is due to a selection effect; sanctions are successful as threats, but once implemented have already failed to change the target's behavior. 25 They may, therefore, only be carried out for reputational reasons. Another explanation is that sanctions may be carried out as punishment with no expectation of a behavioral change. They may also be largely symbolic in nature; the United
States has repeatedly passed layer upon layer of economic sanctions on North Korea and Iran despite the lack of trade remaining with the United States to sanction. 26 A substantial fraction (34 out of 226) of the cases studied in this article are implemented on targets whose trade with the sanctioner is less than 0.1% of the target's GDP.
Several studies on the duration of sanctions episodes support the general liberal outlook.
Although sanctions onset is more likely when initiators perceive sanctions will be domestically 20 (Drezner 2000) . 21 For a nice overview and critique of these debates, see (Drezner 2000) . 22 (Hufbauer et al. 1990 ) 23 For a response to HSE, see: (Pape 1997) and (Morgan and Schwebach 1997) . For more general discussions of the ineffectiveness of sanctions, see (Galtung 1967; Hoffmann 1967; Knorr 1977; Renwick 1981; Daoudi and Dajani 1983) 24 (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000) 25 (Drezner 2003) 26 For accounts of the multi-layered sanctions on Iran, see Perkovich (2004) ; for North Korea, see Lee (2003 (Marinov 2003) 31 (Mansfield and Pollins 2001) . 32 (Keohane 1984; Snidal 1991) 33 (Russett and Oneal 2001) . 34 (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Yarborough and Yarborough 1997) 35 (Fernandéz 1997; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Grieco 1988; Mastanduno 1991) (Fearon 1995) 37 (Viner 1950; Mansfield 1998; Whalley 1996) 38 (Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Bearce 1999; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Powers 2003a Powers , 2004 39 (Hafner-Burton 2005) 40 (Fernandéz and Portes 1998) 46 (Kant [1795] belonging to a common community and therefore will be less likely to sanction each other.
WHY INTERNATIONAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS COULD ENCOURAGE

SANCTIONS
Trade institutions are not a panacea for conflict; they also place states into relative positions of power over each other and increase competition. We challenge the three mechanisms proposed by institutional theory: institutional information-sharing and dispute resolution mechanisms are often underdeveloped, ineffective, or undermined by powerful members of international institutions; the material gains from trade and the prestige that can be obtained from membership in many agreements could cause conflict through shifting the balance of power; and institutional memberships can create competitive relationships of animosity among some states rather than community. 52 All suggest that PTAs may at times encourage rather than deter sanctions among members.
47 (Angell 1913; Zimmern 1936) 48 (Wallace 1994) 49 (Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001) 50 (Bearce 2003; Schiff and Winters 1998) similarly assume that trade between neighboring states creates trust and reduces the likelihood of conflict and that international organizations can serve a trust-building function. See also (Schiff and Winters 2002) . 51 (Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Bearce 1999; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Powers 2003b Powers , 2004 52 (Gallarotti 1991) 
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS ARE INEFFECTIVE
Only a minority of PTAs are aptly equipped with the necessary institutional features to reduce conflict leading to sanctions. Not all PTAs offer dispute settlement procedures and many are weakly institutionalized. Trade institutions may very well have a direct impact on sanction behavior, but it is unclear a priori that this impact is peace-making rather than conflictprovoking; it is probably the case that different institutional features have a varying impact.
53
Organizational pathologies often affect international organizations; 54 since the international system lacks a central authority, such pathologies are even more likely to occur. Consequently, the promised benefits of trade institutions for resolving conflict are unlikely to be seen in practice.
Hypothesis 1: Pairs of states with joint membership in international trade institutions are
no more likely to engage in sanctions than pairs without joint membership.
Hypothesis 2: Pairs of states with joint membership in international trade institutions with higher levels of dispute resolution are no less likely to engage in sanctions than pairs with joint membership in institutions with lower levels of dispute resolution.
PTAS CREATE POWER IMBALANCES
PTAs can potentially create two types of relative power imbalances, enhancing market and social power unevenly among PTA members; they do so creating relative asymmetries in economic gains and by endowing states that belong to a large number of important PTAs with more social prestige. PTAs therefore give states both the motives to implement sanctions as symbolic or punitive actions and the incentives to take advantage of these imbalances; market power (GDP)
insulates states from the potentially harmful effects of sanctions on the initiator, while social power (prestige) allows states to call upon and rely on external support of their efforts. (Schiff and Winters 1998; Bhagwati 1996; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996; Eichengreen and Frankel 1995; Viner 1950; Vamvakidis 1998; Pomfret 1997; Melo and Panagariya 1996; Lawrence 1996) 56 Examples include the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of states (ACP), or the Generalized System of Preferences supplied by the EU or the US. 57 (Hirschman 1945; Grieco 1990) 58 (Fernandéz 1997; Staiger and Tabellini 1987; Whalley 1996) 59 (Hirschman 1945) 60 (Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1970 Waltz , 1979 61 (Gowa and Mansfield 1993) 62 (Pollins 1989b (Pollins , 1989a Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Morrow 1997 (Barbieri 2002 (Barbieri , 1996 number of international interests to defend and thus may end up in more disputes. 63 Similarly, scholars argue that institutions are simply vehicles for market power politics in general, and will be ineffective in preventing real conflicts between powerful members from arising through dispute resolution mechanisms. Dorussen and Ward (in this issue) find that when the state with the least prestige in a dyad increases in IO prestige (a weak-link hypothesis), militarized disputes occur less often. 68 States with a great deal of social power (in this case, prestige from being a member of many PTAs) may therefore have an increased propensity to engage in sanctioning behavior due to an increased expectation of popular support of their aggressive actions, a form of political bandwagoning; 69 however, common knowledge of 63 (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004, p. 20) 65 (Mearsheimer 1994) . 66 (Coleman 1990; O'Neill 1999 (Walt 1988; Schweller 1994 Schweller , 2004 these states' privileged positions may result in more conflicts being solved in the prestigious state's favor before sanctions start, a form of rational deterrence. We believe that the former is more likely, since a target's ability to assess social support is inherently less certain than its ability to assess other characteristics such as formal alliances. (Levine and Moreland 1998; Burt 1987) 80 (Bales and Borgatta 1955; Thorne and Luria 1986; Maccoby 1990) 81 (Waltz 1979) 89 Traditional sample limitations to politically relevant dyads in the study of war are not appropriate here, as almost all states trade with all other states making sanctions possible. We choose to use all dyads instead of the "sanctions-relevant" dyads used by Cox and Drury since we observe several instances of sanctions among non-"sanctions relevant" dyads or dyads with low levels of trade, as well as multiple (redundant) layers of sanctions on some states. We replicate on this limited sample as a robustness check.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
We explore the merits of our conjectures using pooled cross-national time-series data. Sanctions are coded to have continued in a year if the sanctions were still in force at the end of the year. 103 We employ these data because they are ubiquitous in the study of economic sanctions and are the basis for nearly all empirical research; 104 they also suffer considerable limitations.
97 (Gleditsch 2002 (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000) 111 For the subset of matching dyads between our samples, our PTA ij is highly correlated with their variable (~0.84). 112 Data measuring PTA integration are only available for a smaller sample of PTAs than the sample which we use for our analyses; while we observe over 170,000 observations of joint membership in PTAs in our sample, the integration sample records just over 120,000 observations. This difference in sample size makes comparison difficult. We thank Jon Pevehouse for generously sharing these data. 113 The term Non-Reciprocal refers to the structure of a trade agreement that offers one-way access of a state party to the negotiated market of another state or trading entity. 114 The goal of a Free Trade Area is to facilitate easier trading within the area. These agreements prohibit internal tariffs among members, although each member country keeps their own external tariff policies. 115 A Customs Union is a Free Trade Area with common external tariff policies on goods imported from countries outside the union. 116 A Common Market is a Customs Union with removal of restrictions on the free flow of capital, labor, and technology among members. 117 (Balassa 1961) Finally, we control for a variety of alternative factors believed to shape the onset of sanctions. Polity i and Polity j measure the political character of the potential sender and targets, respectively. The variables range from -10 for a state characterized by extremely autocratic political institutions, to 10 for a state characterized by extremely democratic political institutions.
These variables control for arguments common in the literature that democracies may be less likely to initiate or suffer economic sanctions, as well as faster to recover. 119 Trade ij measures the sum of i's exports to and imports from j in year t, while GDP i and GDP j measure the real Gross Domestic Product of the potential sender and target states respectively in trillions of 1996 US dollars. Both are centered at mean zero for proper interpretation of the interaction terms. Allies ij equals 1 if dyad members were linked by formal mutual defense treaties, neutrality pacts, or an entente, and equals 0 otherwise. This variable is important to control for the common wisdom that allies are generally likely to conflict with each other less than non-allied states because they share a common security interest.
RESULTS
We report estimates of equation 1 in the first column of Table 1 ; 120 columns two, three and four report estimates for models testing fewer hypotheses separately. Our results cast doubt on the institutional view. Dyads linked by mutual ties to trade institutions are not less likely to engage in sanctioning behavior than other pairs of states, regardless of their associated market power
, and may in fact be associated with sanctions onset; in two of the four models, dyads that belong to a PTA are more likely (at the 0.10 level) than other dyads to sanction. While PTAs may help to prevent war among trade partners, they do not prevent economic sanctions. are just as likely to experience sanctions as dyads with memberships in free trade agreements, non-reciprocal agreements, or no PTAs at all. Since this variable is non-significant and came from a different sample of PTAs, we drop it for the rest of our analyses.
Although relative market power does not influence whether PTA members use sanctions, disparities in social power and positions do. We find three circumstances under which trade institutions significantly increase the likelihood of sanctions among PTA members. When the potential initiator is prestigious in the socioeconomic network (PTAPrestige i-1 > 0), is in the same group as a potential target (PTAClusterSame ij-1 > 0), or belongs to a particularly large group (PTAClusterSize i-1 > 0), they are more likely to enact sanctions against a target. This result was robust whether the liberal institutional variables were included in the regression or not (columns one and four) and indicates that relative disparities in social power, measured by the socioeconomic networks formed through PTAs, exacerbate the use of sanctions rather than decrease it, and that senders in the same group with targets or senders in groups with a larger number of members were more likely to enact sanctions, although the findings on
PTAClusterSame ij-1 are only of significance at the 0.10 level.
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Our findings with respect to other variables were mixed. An increase in the GDP of either initiator or target leads to an increased likelihood of sanctions, consistent with standard power politics views, but regardless of PTA membership. Some of our results were consistent with previous findings on sanctions; while democracies are more likely to use sanctions, they are less likely to be targets, although this latter observation is an artifact of US hegemony, as we discuss our results are robust. Dyads linked by mutual ties to trade institutions are neither more nor less likely to sanction than other dyads. 122 In contrast to Hafner-Burton and Montgomery's research on IGO social networks and militarized disputes, we found that states were more likely to enact sanctions against other states in the same structurally equivalent cluster. This is consistent with a logic of competition among peers, rather than a logic of in-group favoritism. Similarly, states that were highly prestigious in the PTA network were more likely to enact sanctions, whereas for dyads in the IGO network, large differences in prestige tended to dampen militarized disputes. In both IGO and PTA networks, particularly large clusters tended to increase conflict. (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006a).
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below. Additionally, alliances seem to increase the use of sanctions. This apparently odd result seems more plausible if sanctions are viewed as a less violent alternative to war. We found that increased trade actually led to decreased sanctions, regardless of PTA membership and consistent with the general liberal notion that increased trade should decrease conflict.
--TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE--
We compute predicted probabilities of sanctions onset based on the model presented in column three of Table 1 to interpret our findings. The results are presented in Table 2 . The first row predicts the baseline probability that an average dyad engages in sanctions. 123 This probability is low because sanctions are rare events. In column 1 we calculate the absolute change in the probability of sanctions onset across a range of conditions to isolate the influence of each covariate. In column 2 we compute the relative risk for sanctions onset due to that change. The results show that PTAs influence the probability of sanctions in important ways.
Although mutual membership does not change the probability that dyads engage in sanctions in a statistically significant way, senders' relative social power-measured by their prestige in the socioeconomic network, and social position-measured by their cluster size and whether they belong to the same cluster as the potential target-do in ways that can promote conflict rather than quell it.
The influence of prestige is particularly notable. When the initiating state is extremely prestigious, the probability that sanctions will take place is ten times greater than under average conditions. Controlling for trade and the GDP of states, prestige strongly reinforces the aggressive behavior of powerful actors; states that belong to many PTAs with many other states are considerably more likely to aggressively sanction others. By contrast, when the initiating state enjoys no prestige, the probability that sanctions will occur is only slightly smaller than average; while high degrees of prestige can encourage potential initiators to sanction, low prestige does not substantially deter them. Our results confirm that democracies are indeed more likely than other states to initiate economic sanctions but that states are less likely to be targeted if they are democracies than autocracies. Moving from an autocracy (-10) to a democracy (+10)
increases the fractional risk of implementing sanctions by a factor close to that of prestige. Table 2 also suggests that, like prestige, the size of the initiators' and targets' economies matter a great deal; wealthier states are much more likely to initiate sanctions and also to be a target, but as bilateral trade increases to its maximum value, the probability goes to zero, although the maximum here is a clear outlier.
-- Similarly, our results with respect to allies are mixed: the US in particular is more likely to sanction its allies (see Table 3 ), even if military allies in general have only a weak propensity to do so. Still, we do find that increased levels of trade do lead to a decrease in economic sanctioning behavior; while liberal claims about PTAs may not hold up, the general pacific effects of trade do appear to hold. We do not directly test the democratic peace hypothesis in our work, although elsewhere we find that when accounting for the role of the US, democracies are no more or less likely to sanction each other than other dyads; 125 however, democracies were consistently more likely to enact sanctions than other states.
FURTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our findings are strongly robust: members of the same PTA are no less likely to engage in economic sanctions than other pairs of states and they may actually be more likely. (Cox and Drury 2006; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006b) 127 (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) 128 (Marinov 2003) 129 Additionally, we have limited our sample to Cox and Drury's "sanctions relevant dyads" in order to ensure consistency, although as we have argued, we do not believe this sample is appropriate because sanctions do take place within non-relevant dyads. Our substantive results on this reduced sample are identical. We have also replaced our binary PTA ij variable with a continuous measure to see whether a greater number of mutual memberships in PTAs affects dyads' likelihood of sanctions and find no substantive change in our results. We have replaced our binary Allies if variable with several binary measures to see whether formal mutual defense treaties, neutrality pacts, or ententes affect the likelihood of sanctions independently. We find no such evidence. 130 States in the EU are also more likely to sanction, although less so than the US. When we included an EU sender dummy, our prestige results lost statistical significance.
the PTA network as well as cluster size both increase the likelihood. Moreover, controlling for GATT/WTO membership as well as temporal dependence has no effect on our findings. In other results not reported in our tables, we found that when trade was eliminated or when contiguity and the log of the distance between states were included, the PTA coefficient became insignificant, but other variables were not substantively affected; when trade dependence of both the target and initiator are substituted for bilateral trade, an increase in the initiator's dependence decreases the likelihood of sanctions, while the target's trade dependence has no effect. Including the capability ratio of states had no substantive effect on the results, either.
CONCLUSION
A core premise uniting the contributions to this proposed special issue is that international institutions shape international affairs of all kinds but that they do so in complex and often contingent ways that have yet to be very well understood or observed. 138 A principal goal of our collective research is to show systematically the many ways by which institutions shape international politics. Our contribution accordingly makes the claim that a growing population of international trade institutions plays an independent and significant role in the dynamics of economic sanctions between states-a rapport between increasingly authoritative institutions in world affairs and sharply criticized foreign policies that has never been robustly examined.
Widespread claims that international institutions are either intrinsically peace promoting or entirely epiphenomenal miss an important part of what institutions do and how they shape political behavior. International institutions not only provide for the reduction of transaction costs or arbitration between states depending on their individual designs, and they are not just mirrors for states' material power; they also confer relative positions of social power on states in the international system. These positions, in turn, can exacerbate conflict and lead to the use of sanctions. PTAs provide many useful and even virtuous functions; they can at times institutionalize cooperation among nations, preventing outbreaks of war and repression of human rights in some circumstances. Many of their consciously designed institutional qualities provide these services. Yet they also form a socioeconomic network that structures the international system and creates a counteractive set of forces that-far from solving the world's problems driven by interstate aggression-can exacerbate conflict by creating distributional problems in both economic wealth and structural power.
Our approach thus relies upon insights from realism in international relations and from social network analysis common to other behavioral sciences about what international institutions do and how they shape politics. In particular, our social network approach suggests that PTA memberships endow particular states that are connected to a large number of other states with social power (prestige); in the realm of economic sanctions, we found that states with a great deal of prestige from trade institutions are more likely to initiate conflict. This may in part be due to the highly asymmetrical networks that PTAs create, which are much less egalitarian than international institutions in general; the difference in prestige between the most esteemed states and least is much wider as a result. Additionally, we found that states that have similar patterns of joining institutions are more likely to conflict. PTAs are, by nature, exclusionary;
consequently, states that are in similar network positions are more likely to conflict. Moreover, the more states that are in the same group, the more competition that results among them. An analogy with ecological niches might be appropriate: increased competition results if a particular niche (or position) is overcrowded.
PTAs are growing in number, authority, and membership, and are increasingly influencing conflicts taking place within and between states. As institutions go, they are among the few that offer design features that our most prominent theorists of international organizations believe matter, such as the creation of substantial expected gains, dispute settlement, and shared 
